officials, 0 which are widely prohibited. 17 Others have been political contributions,Is the legality of which differs from country to country. 10 Many payments, whether legal or illegal, have been made indirectly through special funds, sales agents, or foreign subsidiaries. 20 The flow of money has been obscured by a variety of disguises. 2 ' Though the mode of overseas corporate payments has been established, and indeed previously may have been known by certain United States officials, 2 2 the motivation for such payments has been of doing business, provided that they were reasonable compensation) with id. at 372 ("compensation" used simply as conduit for payments to government officials does not constitute deductible business expense). Cf. SEC Report, supra note 7, at 27-28 (making same distinction for purposes of imposing disclosure requirements).
16. E.g., Lockheed Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. paid senior government officials in several countries); Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1975 , at 10, col. 3 (Merck & Co. paid primarily lower and middle-level bureaucrats in 36 countries); id., Apr. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (United Brands Co. paid high government official in Honduras).
17. According to John J. McCloy, who chaired a special committee of the Gulf Oil Corporation's board of directors that investigated overseas payments, "[The Gulf committee] could not identify a single country where a bribe of a government official to induce a government to enter into a contract with any company for the supply of its product to that government was not illegal in that country." Bribes Hearings, supra note 1, at 6. See id. at 65 (Leonard Meeker, Center for Law and Social Policy); id. at 103 (Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce).
18. See note 11 supra.
19.
Compare, e.g., Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 10, 33-35 (Gulf Oil's contributions apparently illegal under South Korean law) with id. at 320-21 (Mobil Oil's contributions apparently legal under Italian law, though provision of law requiring disclosure may have been violated) and CORPORATE N. TERG.TL, supra note 1, at 62 (political contributions from corporate funds legal in Canada).
20. The devious means employed to establish and maintain special funds for questionable payments abroad are described in AINC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 41-42 (statement of Donald Alexander, Commissioner of Internal Revenue). For am account of Northrop Corporation's intricate arrangements, see SEC Report, supra note 7, at B-17 to B-18. Foreign sales agents have been frequent conduits for payments to ranking government officials. E.g., MNC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 99 (Northrup Corp. in Saudi Arabia); Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1975 , at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. in Indonesia). Payments have also been funneled through foreign subsidiaries. E.g., SEC Report, supra note 7, at B-3 (Ashland Oil, Inc., in Canada); Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, at 12, col. 2 (Mobil Oil Corp. in Italy); id., July 16, 1975 , at 8, col. 3 (Exxon Corp. in Canada).
21. Virtually every questionable corporate payment has been concealed by means of falsified or inaccurate records. SEC Report, supra note 7, at 3, 13. Payments have also been masked through purported sales commissions, consulting fees, advertising expenses, insurance refunds, legal fees, and employee bonuses, MNC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 83 (statement of James Weldon, Jr., Acting Director, Bureau of Enforcement, CAB); through corporate lobbying "covers," Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 124-26, 129-30, 155-67 (Northrop officer and director); through sham invoices and secret bank accounts, id. at 243, 248-49 (Archie Monroe, controller, Exxon Corp.); and through representation as entertainment expenses, Comment, supra note 15, at 361 n.4.
22. E.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at I, col. 3 (U.S. embassy officials reportedly informed of South Korean "requests" for corporate payments); id., July 15, 1976, at 1, col. 3; id., July 18, 1976, § IV, at 2, col. 2 (Aluminum Co. of America reports to SEC that U.S. ambassador solicited S25,000 for foreign officials and political parties; country later reported to be Jamaica); id., Apr. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1; id., Apr. 4, 1976, § IV, at 2, col. 2 (alleged CIA awareness of Lockheed bribes in Japan). more difficult to ascertain. Most corporate representatives who admit having made payments that were illegal under local law insist that they did so in response to political pressure ranging from low-level bureaucratic stalling to high-level threats of imminent expropriation or expulsion. Available evidence suggests that such pressure is not uncommon.
2 3 Yet recent disclosures make it increasingly clear that in many instances overseas payments have been made with little or no coercion by the host government. Rather, American firms have disbursed corporate funds to gain advantage over other firms seeking foreign government concessions or contracts. 24 Indeed, notwithstanding the assertion of some American corporations that overseas payments must be made to meet foreign competition, 2 a number of payments evidently have been made to overcome American competitors. 2 -6 Payments made to influence foreign governmental decisions concerning the operations of American firms are the focus of this article. These payments can be viewed as an overseas manifestation of two interrelated problems that are of increasing domestic urgency: the problem of corporate accountability to shareholders and the gen- Lesser amounts may ha~e gone to Korean politicians as a result of several commercial ventures into which Gulf was pressured. Id. at 111-22. Finally, some unascertainable portion of more than S4 million, billed as travel and entertainment expenses over a four-year period, was spent by Gulf to lubricate the "'wheels of progress'" in Korea. Id. at 105-08. One particular "'off-the books'" luind, used to expedite routine governmental action, disbursed approximately s33,0toI in three years. hli. at 108-11. 26. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4. at 42 (Task Force Letter). E.g., Bribes Hearing, supra note 1, at 39 (George Ball, Lehman Brothers, regardillg Lockheed payments in Japan); Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 136-37 (Richard Millar, director of Northrop Corp.); id. at 165-67, 178-79, ('homas Jones, Northrop president and chairman of the board); Wall St. J., May 11, 1976, at 3, col. 1 (SEC alleges that General Tire and Rubber Co. paid agent to persuade French bank not to make loan to American competitor planning to build plant in Chile).
E.g., Foreign Policy Hearings
eral public 27 and the problem of industrial concentration, which tends to encourage anticompetitive practices.2 1 Awareness of both aspects pinpoints the inadequacy of recent proposals for dealing with overseas corporate payments and aids evaluation of the potential effectiveness of existing remedies, both those designed to ensure corporate accountability and those designed to preserve competition.
This article examines recent proposals and notes that all neglect the anticompetitive effects of overseas payments. It observes the same shortsightedness in current efforts to initiate diplomatic solutions and to adapt existing legal mechanisms for ensuring corporate accountability. Finally, it argues that the antitrust laws provide a more effective approach to both the accountability and the anticompetitive aspects of corporate payments abroad.
I. Recent Proposals
Both the executive and the legislative branches recently made proposals for dealing with overseas payments. None of these proposals attacked the phenomenon as a threat to American competition overseas. regarded overseas payments as a problem solely of managerial accountability to shareholders. Near the close of the last term of Congress, the Senate finally recognized that neither of these conceptions provides a foundation for adequate policy. Yet it too failed to draft legislation confronting the anticompetitive character of many overseas payments.
The Task Force proposed legislation that would have treated all questionable expenditures as extortion payments and the entire problem as primarily one of foreign relations. 209 American firms would have been required to report any payment above a certain amount to the Secretary of Commerce, who in turn would have disseminated the reports to other appropriate federal agencies. 30 The affected foreign government would have been notified of such reports at the discretion of the Secretary of State. 3 ' The reports would have been made public one year after being filed with the Secretary of Commerce, unless the Secretary of State or the Attorney General determined that disclosure would be inadvisable. 32 Either civil or criminal penalties could have been imposed for failure to report. 33 If the sole motivation for overseas payments were host government coercion, the proposals of the President's Task Force might be satisfactory. Mandatory disclosure of extortion payments, backed by stiff penalties for nondisclosure, might provide the truly victimized corporation with some incentive to resist extortion demands if the cost of resistance were low and to refer the matter to the State Department if the cost of resistance rose. By the same token, such a policy might spur diplomatic efforts to discourage would-be extorters. Intergovernmental dialogue may be the most promising means to reduce such extortion.
To characterize all overseas payments as extortion payments, and therefore as a diplomatic problem, however, is inaccurate; some payments are clearly bribes. Admittedly the line between extortion and bribery may prove illusory in many instances; corporations may readily accede to pressure because they see that competitive advantage can be gained thereby. Yet the distinction is important, because those questionable transactions in which American firms are more instiga- In contrast to the Task Force proposals, the bill introduced at the request of the SEC focused on perceived weaknesses in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and sought to remedy them through amendments imposing stringent accounting requirements." The bill thus implied that the SEC, the traditional monitor of managerial improprieties, would be the appropriate body to combat questionable payments abroad. Rigorous recordkeeping would presumably restrict managerial conduct that might reduce the value of the corporation's securities.
This vision of the questionable corporate payments problem clearly differs from that of the Task Force. But it is a vision no less narrow. For the Task Force, the problem is one of diplomacy; for the SEC, it is one of accountability to shareholders."-Yet owners of registered securities are not the only ones injured when their corporation bribes a foreign official, makes an improper political contribution, or pays inflated agents' fees. Indeed, even where shareholders profit from their corporation's overseas payment, competitors, other American firms in the foreign market, and the foreign government itself may suffer economic harm. Because the SEC and the Task Force failed to appreciate the anticompetitive aspects of questionable corporate payments, their proposals provide no remedies for these victims of the practice.
On their own initiative, members of the 94th Congress introduced numerous bills and amendments to combat the problem of question- (1976) . Tbis code of conduct has been touted as one Clement of the **current Administration approach" to the problem of o erseas corporate payments. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 56-57 (Task Force Letter). The code institutes no enforcement mechanism; it simply exhorts firms not to make illegal or improper payments. The purely hortatory character of the code has led one experienced international observer to describe it as "little more than a pious expression of disapproval." Th ibe Hearings, supra note 1, at 40 (George Ball, Lehman Brothers).
A more strongly worded statement against questionable overseas pa)ments was unaninmously approved nearly a year earlier by the Organization of American States (OAS 50 The present complex of United States laws, however, cannot so easily be discounted as impotent. 51 It is appropriate to consider at length the extent to which existing remedies applicable to domestic manifestations of the problems of corporate accountability and industrial concentration can be brought to bear on their overseas counterparts. The conventional wisdom is that even outright bribery of foreign officials does not violate any American statutes. 52 This conventional wisdom, however, merits reexamination.
II. Questionable Payments Abroad: Ensuring
Corporate Accountability
A. The Inadequacy of Public Remedies
Public control over managerial conduct is presently exercised primarily through obligatory disclosure of corporate activities. Certain federal statutes and regulations require management to supply infor- mation to governmental agencies. Others mandate the provision of information to shareholders. The common assumption is that corporate management will be reluctant to engage in illegal or improper activities if it must inform the government or shareholders about those activities.
A number of federal disclosure requirements apply to questionable corporate payments abroad. The Agency for International Development (AID), for example, requires American firms whose sales to foreign governments are financed by AID loans to report all commissions or fees paid.5 3 Likewise, the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) requires the reporting of any commissions or fees paid by American firms in connection with foreign governmental purchases funded through Eximbank loans. 5 The Defense Department has similar regulations applicable to foreign military sales.' 5 Firms that file false statements with these federal agencies may incur criminal penalties. 5 1
If corporations characterize questionable payments as tax-deductible business expenses, they may run afoul of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Section 162(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that payments to foreign governmental officials cannot be deducted if such payments would have violated federal law, had that law been appli- cable to the transaction.5 7 Under § 162(c)(2), payments to persons overseas other than governmental officials are nondeductible if the taxpayer would be subject to criminal penalties or loss of business license under state or federal lawY. Although the IRS has not routinely required taxpayers to furnish information on the payment of bribes and kickbacks, it has begun an extensive investigation of corporate tax returns for unlawful deductions and related tax violations. 50 Of all the governmentally imposed disclosure requirements, only those of the SEC mandate a direct flow of information to shareholders. Corporate management has no express statutory obligation to reveal corporate payments abroad to corporate shareholders. By regulation, however, the SEC does require the disclosure to investors of all "material" information as well as all information whose concealment would make released information misleading. 60 The SEC has taken the position that improper payments have an important bearing on the quality of a corporation's earnings. 0 1 Moreover, such payments are pertinent to "an evaluation of management's stewardship over corporate assets."' 3 2 Although payments significant in amount or relating to a significant amount of business are definitely material, 3 the SEC has refrained ftom making such significance the touchstone of materiality. Rather, it has decided to weigh, in each case, "the benefits of .. .disclosure against its assessment of the extent of investor interest and the cost and utility of the particular disclosure."' 6 This ad hoc balancing scheme is not likely to provide an effective 64. Id. at 21. This weighing process entails consideration of (i) whether the payment was made within the corporation's financial accountability system, (ii) the legality of the pa)ment under local law, (iii) the identity of the recipient, (iv) the amount of money paid, (v) the extent of management's knowledge or participation, (vi) whether payments ha e become an integral part of the corporation's operations, and (vii) whether payments have ceased. Id. at 23-32. Before these official guidelines were articulated, similar ones were proposed in Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 28-33.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 215, 1976 weapon against questionable overseas payments. Although neither the SEC nor the courts are inexperienced at defining "materiality" in instances of improper corporate payoffs, 6 5 the notion remains too malleable to anchor guidelines for corporate conductY ) I' Moreover, together, the materiality requirement and the jurisdiction of the SEC limit considerably the scope of disclosure. The SEC is not authorized to require disclosure of information important to the public but not of interest to investors. For example it does not, and arguably cannot, require disclosure of the names of payment recipients or the specific purpose of the payments. 1 Nor can it require disclosure by any corporations that do not issue federally registered securities. 0 8 The focus of SEC law enforcement efforts is simply too narrow to comprehend the problem of overseas corporate payments 9 The even narrower scope of the other disclosure regulations discussed above makes them all the more inadequateY 3 These public remedies thus cannot ensure corporate accountability.
B. The Inadequacy of Private Remedies
The limited scope of public disclosure requirements enhances the importance of private remedies to ensure corporate accountability. Yet the primary vehicle for protecting shareholders from managerial 66. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 5-7 (criticizing SEC for straining notion of materiality in combating corporate payoffs); Note, Foreign Bribes and the Sccuritic% Acts' Disclosure Requiremets, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1232-38 (1976) (concluding that materiality is impractical basis for disclosure requirements concerning overseas pa)Imnits). The actions of certain corporations are cogent evidence of the ambiguity of the materiality standard. Several firms that lad admitted making extensive qucstionable paymuents abroad have told the SEC that they do not consider the payments to be material. See Solomon & Linville, supra note 7, at 328 n.118. Evidence from shareholder nmeetings and empirical studies lends support to the corporations' claim that information about improper pa)ments is not of concern to imcstors. See N.Y. "limes, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 19, col. 1, and 101, col. 5 (describing lack of shareholder interest evinced at annual meetings of United Brands Co. and Exxon Corp.); id., Nov. 12, 1976, § D, at 5, col. 1 (SEC study of 75 corporations implicated in questionable paynents incidents indicates only slight, ephemeral impact on their stock prices).
67. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 53 (Task Force Letter). 68. This limitation is quite significant. See note 46 supra. 69. "[SEGI disclosure is designed to protect the interests of the prudent investor. It is, arguably, not an appropriate mechanism to deal with the full array of national concerns caused by thd problem of questionable payments." Foreign Officials Hearing, sup)a note 4, at 56 (Task Force Letter). See Note, upra note 66, at 1239-42.
70. See Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 52 (Task Force Letter); Murphy, supra note 9, at 482; Solomon & Linville, supra note 7, at 334-35.
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad improprieties-the derivative suit-faces major obstacles to its successful employment against managers involved in questionable payments abroad.
These obstacles exist despite the high fiduciary standards to which corporate officers and directors are ostensibly held. Officers and directors are duty-bound to refrain from self-dealing at the expense of the corporation, 7 ' to ensure that their activities do not violate the law or the corporation's charter, 7 -and to exercise diligently their supervisory responsibilities to avoid waste of corporate assets. 73 Notwithstanding these seemingly exacting duties, courts usually afford officers and directors considerable discretion in the management of a corporation's affairs, so long as they exercise reasonable business judgment in good faith.74
In practice, the business judgment rule tends to insulate management from liability to the corporation unless the conduct in question is clearly wrongful and, moreover, is actually injurious to the corporation. 7 5 Clear wrongfulness includes violation of the law, 70 contravention of public policy, 7 7 and self-dealing. 7 78. Self-serving disloyalty to the corporation can never be rationalized as a business judgment. Consequently, the courts do not require derivative suits alleging a breach demonstrable where the corporation has suffered a measurable net financial loss, though damage to corporate reputation or shareholder relations may suffice to meet this requirement. 7 9 If both actual injury and clear wrongfulness are proven, the managers involved may be subject to claims for damages. 8 0 Alternatively, a court might find that breach of managerial duty is grounds for injunctive remedy where both clear wrongfulness and actual injury are established. The recent Third Circuit decision in Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.sl is suggestive in this regard. There the court reversed the dismissal of a derivative suit seeking to compel the defendant's directors to collect a $1.5 million debt owed the corporation by an American political party. The court held that where the failure to collect the debt allegedly constituted not only a lack of due diligence but also a campaign contribution in violation of federal law, a derivative suit could be brought under New York law. 8 2 The unpaid debt itself met the actual injury requirement."
Courts unwilling to award damages or issue an injunction might allow shareholder remedies in the form of restitution. This remedy has been employed in cases of self-dealing to recover the corporate salaries paid to or the profits realized by disloyal officers and direc- The difficulty with relying on Roth and Miller in a derivative suit arising from questionable corporate payments abroad, however, is twofold. First, particularly if the payment resulted in a lucrative procurement contract or a favorable regulatory decree, a court might be unwilling to find injury to the corporation. Second, even were a court willing to infer injury to corporate reputation or to hold the payment itself an injury, it might be unwilling to rule against management without a demonstration that the payment was illegal under United States law." 5 Significantly, the illegality of the alleged managerial conduct was stressed by both the Miller 9 and the Roth 9 " courts. The remainder of this article argues that corporations making certain overseas payments do violate the antitrust laws. Enforcement of these laws would thus not only preserve competition but also facilitate derivative actions against corporate officers and directors who authorize such payments.
III. Questionable Payments Abroad: Preserving Competition
The applicability of the antitrust laws to the problem of overseas corporate payments has generally been ignored or discounted. 9 ' ", Before considering in turn the validity of each of these characterizations, it is important to explore several initial obstacles to the application of the antitrust laws to overseas payments.
A. Threshold Considerations: Extraterritoriality and Governmental Involvement
The two fundamental questions concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to overseas payments are (i) whether these laws can reach anticompetitive conduct abroad and, (ii) if so, whether they can reach such conduct if foreign governments are involved. Both of these questions were implicitly raised-and answered negatively-in the landmark case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 9 7 In that case the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint arising from the defendant's instigation of the Costa Rican government's seizure of part of the plaintiff's plantation. A high Costa Rican official subsequently obtained title to the property in an irregular ex parte judicial proceeding and sold it to agents of the defendant. In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to actions occurring outside the United States or involving sovereign acts that were lawful in the country in which they were performed. ' now turns on whether the conduct has substantial effect on American commerce at home or abroad.' 01 Whether 'conduct abroad is held to affect United States commerce may depend, in part, on whether the defendant is an American citizen. Where foreign nationals alone are involved, courts may be reluctant to take jurisdiction in the absence of a showing that the conduct in question had a deliberate and substantial effect on United States foreign or domestic commerce. 10 2 'Where an American citizen is involved, in contrast, courts are more likely to assert jurisdiction and consider the effect of the citizen's conduct on United States commerce as a question going to the merits of the antitrust claim.' 0 3 On the merits, the substantiality requirement may vary, depending on the statutory basis for the complaint. Although American Banana's ban on overseas application of the antitrust laws has been effectively overruled, the case lives on through its implicit holding that anticompetitive conduct involving foreign governments does not give rise to antitrust liability. 1 5 Application of this aspect of American Banana to overseas payments is likely to depend on judicial analysis of the act of state doctrine and, in rare instances, of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. These doctrines implicate two interrelated questions: the extent to which a government official's conduct is a sovereign act and the extent to which the court's intervention in the matter would cause friction between the United States and the foreign state or between the judicial and executive branches of government.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields a sovereign state from "the exercise by another state of jurisdiction to enforce rules of law." 11 11 Available only to a defendant foreign government or its agents, the doctrine would seem to have little applicability to litigation Even were a foreign government the object of a payments suit, the sovereign immunity doctrine might not be applied. Generally both the State Department and the courts have restricted the doctrine's protection to noncommercial acts of foreign states.' 9 5 Therefore, many instances of overseas payments to obtain governmental contracts or concessions would seem to fall outside the protective scope of sovereign immunity. 0 9 The restrictive view of the doctrine, however, has so far been taken only in cases in which state-owned or state-operated commercial ventures were defendants."1 0 Thus, one can only speculate whether the restriction would be deemed pertinent in cases in which governments or their officials were defending acts involving improper receipts of payments."' Since most overseas payments suits are likely 111. Conceivably, courts might be reluctant to find an exception to sovereign immunity where the acts involved were improper, because judicial resolution of the dispute might embarrass the foreign government. Cf. Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1971) (immunity granted, absent suggestion by State Department, in action based on defendant government's alleged contract with plaintiff to agitate against another government; court held that contract was potentially embarrassing political activity and rejected plaintiff's argument that impropriety of contract made it unfit for doctrine's protection).
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad to be brought against corporations, however, even an expansive view of the sovereign immunity doctrine would not pose a major obstacle to antitrust action against overseas payments.
In contrast, the broader act of state doctrine is likely to be raised in virtually every case of overseas payments. The core of this doctrine, which predates American Banana, is that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
112 A "principle of decision . . . compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution,""' the act of state doctrine derives from the prudential judgment that judicial inquiry into the legitimacy or propriety of foreign governmental acts might generate international friction and impair the diplomatic function of the executive branch."' Thus, the doctrine may apply to any alleged governmental action, whether or not it was tantamount to compulsion,"15 and whether or not the governmental actor is a party to the lawsuit." 6 Of course, if the foreign government itself brings the action, the act of state doctrine is an untenable defense, for the government in effect is calling for judicial inquiry. The analysis that follows focuses on the use of the act of state defense where the foreign government is not the plaintiff. Although a court might interpret the act of state doctrine to preclude any consideration of a foreign official's conduct, 117 cumstances a corporation's defense may merge the act of state doctrine with the governmental compulsion doctrine, which has developed independently but is an aspect of the broader theory. Known in its domestic context as the Parker v. Brown doctrine,' 2 this defense asserts that a private party does not violate the antitrust laws by performing acts required of it by a sovereign state.
1 2 1 In defending against an antitrust suit arising from an overseas payment, a corporation might invoke the governmental compulsion defense by claiming that its payment had been extorted by the foreign government. A court's ruling on this issue would depend largely on its assessment of the degree of governmental compulsion that the doctrine presumes.
A strict test for governmental compulsion gains support from the progressive limitation of the Parker v. Brown doctrine in domestic cases. Recently the Supreme Court has held the doctrine inapplicable to anticompetitive conduct " 'prompted' " by state action 1 ' 2 ' and to anticompetitive conduct that could not be terminated without state permission but that could have been avoided in the first instance by the defendant. 12 3 These holdings suggest that in the foreign context courts should permit only a narrow governmental compulsion defense. The defendant should carry the burden of proving that its conduct was compelled and that the compulsion derived from the government itself.
The less forceful the governmental involvement, the more courts should insist that the alleged act of state be formal rather than casual. International comity and separation of powers, the underpinnings of the act of state doctrine, 24 argue for applying it only where the alternative is judicial evaluation of the validity of an exercise of public authority-a judicial ruling, a legislative enactment, a regulatory decree, or an executive use of police powers. Thus, nationalization of degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it."' 13 Its decision to apply the act of state doctrine in Sabbatino was based in part on the absence of settled international law standards governing expropriation of aliens' property.' -Furthermore, the Court sensed that judicial intervention in the dispute over expropriated property might cause resentment among foreign states and friction with or embarrassment of the executive branch. 13 If the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state are held inapplicable to cases of overseas corporate payments, the effectiveness of the antitrust laws in protecting American competitors abroad will depend on judicial willingness to find that such payments fall within one or another statutory prohibition. 
B. Overseas Payments as Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade or Attempts to Monopolize
Sections one and two of the Sherman Act 1 42 have long been construed as a broad prohibition of anticompetitive corporate conduct, 43 extending to acts occurring abroad that affect the foreign or domestic commerce of the United States. 14 Both the spirit and the letter of these provisions argue in favor of their application to corporations that make overseas payments to gain advantage over their American competitors in foreign markets. An examination of the pertinent case law supports this view.
If the doctrinal defenses discussed in the preceding section were held inapplicable, the courts would probably consider overseas payments as analogous to other anticompetitive efforts to influence governmental acts. Some such efforts have been held unlawful under the Sherman Act,la5 particularly where they have been directed at obtaining governmental contracts' 4 0 or manipulating existing regula- fore, payments abroad, whether to sway a certain procurement decision or to elicit favorable legislative or executive policies, should be cognizable under the Sherman Act.
In establishing the elements of a § 1 or § 2 offense, two problems might arise. First, to prove a § 1 violation the plaintiff or prosecutor would have to demonstrate the existence of an anticompetitive conspiracy. 1 5 3 If the defendant corporation had colluded with other firms to make payments in restraint of trade, the conduct clearly would be prohibited under a line of cases applying the Sherman Act to multicorporate transnational conspiracies advanced by the procurement of favorable governmental action. 1 5 4 A payment agreement between a single corporation and a government official is no less a conspiracy and, in the absence of countervailing act of state considerations, it should be treated as such.' 1 A more troublesome problem in establishing the elements of a § 1 or § 2 offense is the need to demonstrate the requisite effect on commerce. Beyond the effect required for United States courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, 15 0 sufficient effect must be shown to sub- The Continental Ore decision also supports the proposition that subsidiaries can be coconspirators. One of the corporate defendants was held not immune from the Sherman Act, though it was a subsidiary of another of the defendants. The search for standards is complicated by the failure in some cases to distinguish between the effect necessary to establish jurisdiction and that required to establish a violation.
1 3s Cases holding that allegations have stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act have invariably involved quite substantial restraints on United States foreign commerce.1 59 The head of the Antitrust Division has concluded that the "substantial effect" requirement of the Sherman Act may be a significant impediment to successful prosecution of firms that make overseas payments.' 60 Thus, though the Sherman Act may be a potent statutory weapon against major anticompetitive payment practices abroad,'
6 ' other antitrust laws may be needed to reach payments with lesser anticompetitive effects. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission 157. Though substantiality of effect is not generally considered an element of a domestic § I offense, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940) , this distinction between § 1 and § 2 does not seem to be drawn in discussions of the antitrust laws and American foreign commerce. See, e.g., notes 158-60 infra (citing sources). The distinctions imposed by the statutory language, however, remain. Section 1 is directed at multiparty offenses; proof of a conspiracy to restrain trade is essential to establish a § I violation. Section 2 is directed at market domination; it requires a demonstration that the defendant attempted to obtain monopoly power in a definable geographical and product market. Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad Act, both originally passed to supplement the Sherman Act, are worth examining in this regard.
C. Overseas Payments as Brokerage Fees
Under certain circumstances, the limitations of the Sherman Act can be overcome by considering overseas payments under § 2(c) of the Clayton Act.1'G The language of § 2(c) broadly prohibits the payments of brokerage fees to persons under the direct or indirect control of another party to a sale-of-goods transaction. 163 Thus, the provision may be applicable where overseas payments are made through intermediaries such as sales agents, brokers, or "consultants" to gain governmental procurement contracts. 0 4 Section 2(c) was enacted specifically to outlaw arrangements whereby buyers exacted price concessions disguised as brokerage commissions to their agents or to themselves. 1 6 5 Thus, like other parts of the Robinson-Patman Act amendments to the Clayton Act, § 2(c) was intended to combat price discrimination. In addition, however, the provision reflected congressional concern that false brokerage agreements undermined confidence in brokers generally, thereby impairing their important role as a market mechanism. 16 0 Since the purpose of the provision was not to discourage the pay-162. Section 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970), provides: It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid. 164. For examples of this common practice, see note 14 supra. 165. Enactment of § 2(c) was a response to an investigation of chain stores by the FTC that revealed that large chain buyers were obtaining indirect price concessions by creating dummy brokers whose "fee" the buyer forced the seller to pay. But this was not the only trade practice intended to be reached by § 2(c). For example, Representative Wright Patman explained on the floor of the House:
A practice has grown up whereby large mass buyers bribe representatives of the seller ... under the guise of a brokerage allowance. It is not a brokerage allowance at all; it is a bribe. [Section 2(c)] will not compel the use of a broker but it will prohibit one party from bribing the representative of the other under the guise of brokerage allowances or commissions. though best known for its dicta suggesting that across-the-board reductions of commissions on large sales might be permissible under § 2(c),1 73 actually reaffirmed the provision's unqualified ban on sham brokerage. The Court indicated that there could be no cost justification for paying unearned brokerage and that the "services rendered" exception would not shield payments to another's broker unless the broker's services were in the interest of its principal.' 7 4 In a footnote the Court expressly stated that § 2(c) prohibits certain forms of commercial bribery. Thus, the thrust of the Broch Court's opinion lends support to a line of lower court cases in which private parties have successfully sued to recover treble damages for injuries incurred from the pay-167. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a fish food producer could recover treble damages from a competitor and from a state official whom the competitor had bribed in order to obtain contracts to supply fish food to the state.'
75
Citing Broch and other cases, the Rangen court rejected the defendants' argument that § 2(c) applies only where a brokerage commission constitutes price discrimination. 7 9 The court noted that both Congress at the time of enactment and the Supreme Court in Broch had recognized the provision's coverage of commercial bribery. 8 0 The court held that the "services rendered" exception did not include "services performed by a buyer's agent for the seller but against the interest of the buyer."' 81 Finally, the court concluded that although the payments involved must be made to a party to the transaction or to someone connected with that party in an agency, representative, or intermediary relationship, a state employee having no official responsibility for the state's procurement policies who nevertheless did influence the state's purchasing decisions could be regarded as an intermediary within the meaning of § 2(c). foreign nations,"' '1 3 the Robinson-Patman Act, as an amendment to the Clayton Act, reaches both interstate and international business transactions. 8 4 Although the international implications of the Robinson-Patman Act were once described as dormant, 85 two district court cases suggest how easily the recent disclosures of overseas payments could activate these implications of § 2(c).
In Baysoy v. Jessup Steel Co., 186 a citizen of Turkey sought damages for an alleged breach of a contract in which the defendant, an American corporation, had agreed, upon completion of a sale to the plaintiff of a quantity of ferrochrome, to pay the plaintiff a percentage of the purchase price as commission. The court, in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, held that even assuming the contract could be said to contemplate an export sale, § 2(c) applied and barred enforcement of the brokerage fee contract. 1 8 7 In support of its holding the court noted the Clayton Act's definition of commerce. 8 8 It also cited Representative Patman's opinion that to determine the limit and scope of the clauses other than § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is necessary to turn to the definition of commerce found in the Clayton Act. 18 9 The court concluded that the plaintiff's brokerage fee did not fall within the "services rendered" exception because none of the services alleged were rendered to the seller. Rather, all services rendered were for the buyer's own benefit. 9 Subsequently, in Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman &¢ Sons,' 9 1 a foreign company sued its chief buyer and an American corporation for allegedly conspiring to extract exorbitant prices from the plaintiff under the guise of arm's length bargaining. The court held that the commercial bribery alleged by the plaintiff was within the proscription of § 2(c).' 9 2 The court further held, citing Baysoy, that § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act applies to export sales. 19 3 One commentator, writing before Canadian Ingersoll-Rand, speculated that Baysoy would prove "aberrational."' ' 9 4 Since Congress had
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Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad not intended the Robinson-Patman Act to preclude American firms from making discriminatory export sales, the commentator contended, future cases might construe the jurisdictional elements of § 2(c) in pari materia with those of § 2(a), thereby excluding export transactions. 19 5 The decision in Canadian Ingersoll-Rand, however, suggests that the revelations of questionable brokerage commissions abroad may make Baysoy not aberrational but precedential. Indeed, as the next section indicates, to the extent that false brokerage commissions are considered an unfair method of competition, § 2(c) should be read in pari materia with the Federal Trade Commission Act, whose extraterritorial scope is expressly established.
D. Overseas Payments as Unfair Methods of Competition
Courts consistently have held that the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act are to be read in pari materia. 19 0 Any violation of the Clayton Act is also a violition of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1 97 which declares unfair methods of competition to be unlawful. 9 s Thus, payment of false brokerage may be the basis for liability not only under § 2(c) of the Clayton Act but also under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Moreover, the expansive scope of § 5199 may make it possible to reach overseas payments whether or not they were made in the form of brokerage fees and whether or not they were made in the context of a sale-ofgoods transaction. Significantly, the FTC already expressly proscribes commercial bribery in various industries as an unfair trade practice.
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The FTC's jurisdiction over unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce has been specifically extended by § 4 of the Webb-195. Id. In arguing that overseas discrimination is beyond the reach of § 2(c), Rowe had in mind "dumping"--not overseas payments. 1 to include conduct outside the United States. Although the purpose of the Webb-Pomerene Act as a whole was to permit combinations of American companies to engage in export trade, 2 02 its effect has been quite restrictive. As one commentator has observed, the Act is "an anomalous statute which exempts export associations from the Sherman Act upon such strict conditions that the Sherman Act appears to be actually reinforced with additional prohibitions." 2 0 3
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Branch v. FTC 20 4 indicates the scope of the Webb-Pomerene Act. In that case, the court held that the FTC had jurisdiction under both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the W\ebb-Pomerene Act to issue a cease and desist order prohibiting a correspondence school operating in the United States from employing unfair and fraudulent practices in soliciting students in Latin American countries to the detriment of other United States firms competing in the same field. The court found it irrelevant that all the persons deceived were in Latin America.
0
The FTC was not seeking to protect the school's customers in Latin America but to protect its domestic competitors. 20 6 Since § 4 of the WebbPomerene Act is a "remedial statute" designed to "free foreign commerce of unfair trade practices," the court decided to construe it liberally in order to effectuate the congressional purpose.2 0 7
Branch suggests that actions brought under the Federal Trade Commission Act are not likely to be tested according to the Sherman Act's substantial-effect standard. In Branch the FTC's jurisdiction to issue a cease and desist order prohibiting the deceptive overseas practices abroad of the American correspondence school was based merely on a showing that a few other American correspondence schools did business in the same region and might be injured by the defendant's conduct. 2 08 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the Lanham Act, which prohibits "unfair competition" in trademarks, 2 0 gives federal courts jurisdiction to award an American corporation relief for Vol. 86: 215, 1976
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 215, 1976 would be the most likely defendant, particularly if the payment was made either directly from corporate coffers or through a fully controlled subsidiary. An independent subsidiary or a consulting organization 2 1 5 over which the court could obtain personal jurisdiction 210 might be a more likely defendant if the payment was made indirectly or with little or no approval by headquarters. Finally, responsible individuals, such as corporate officers and directors, sales agents, brokers, and other intermediaries might be liable for their role in the unlawful transaction.
Whether or not the Justice Department or the FTC decides to bring an action against these potential defendants, a number of private parties could seek legal or equitable remedies for violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 217 Under § 4 of the Clayton Act 21 8 a "person" 219 has standing to sue for treble damages if, by reason of an antitrust violation, that person has suffered injury to "his business or property." The Supreme Court has not made a definitive interpretation of this injury requirement, and the lower federal courts have proposed diverse standards: requiring the injury to be a "direct" result of the violation; 220 requiring the plaintiff to be within the "target area" of the violation; 221 plaintiff who had not acted in good faith in situation that gaie rise to claim). The "unclean hands" defense would likely be raised if the plaintiff in the overseas payments suit had itself been involved in questionable payments. Vol. 86: 215, 1976 ments may often adversely affect American firms operating in the same geographical area, though not competing in the same product market. If, for example, a corporation induces a foreign government to expend certain resources on "guns" rather than "butter," not only competitive manufacturers of armaments but also producers of nonmilitary goods may be injured.
-
Or, if one major American firm in a foreign country makes payments to government officials as a matter of course, other American firms in the country, regardless of the goods or services they produce, may be more likely than otherwise to find themselves importuned to make similar payments. Thus, in many instances of overseas payments, noncompetitors might qualify for standing to bring treble damage or injunctive suits against antitrust violators. Moreover, if the evidence to support their allegations exists, albeit in the hands of individuals or corporations abroad, there are procedures to facilitate its discovery.
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A recent seminal Eighth Circuit decision raises the possibility of another class of antitrust plaintiffs: the foreign governments themselves. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 22 8 a foreign government brought a § 4 suit against members of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy from which it had purchased antibiotics. [W]hat you are really saying then is if we don't get their dollars, they might spend them for something unrelated to aircraft. It is not the competition for aircraft that is involved. Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 374. 227. A private plaintiff, no less than the Justice Department in its civil antitrust proceedings, can call upon the panoply of powers vested in the federal courts. A federal court, for example, is empowered to compel American nationals rcsiding abroad to appear and produce documents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1970); FrD. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2). Or, where the testimony of a foreign national is needed, a deposition can be taken by either notice or commission, where the deponent consents or foreign law puts its judicial machinery at the disposal of alien litigants, or by letter rogatory issued by a United States court and transmitted to a foreign tribunal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(2) (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b), 32(a)(3)(B). For a discussion of Narious methods of obtaining evidence from abroad, see 16L J. VON so do foreign governments.
2 29 Furthermore, although the court in an earlier ruling in the same case dismissed a parens patriae claim brought by several foreign governments on behalf of their nationals injured by the alleged price-fixing conspiracy, the court indicated that where the foreign government itself was injured it might be entitled to bring a class action on behalf of any of its injured citizens.
2 3 0 Thus, foreign governments may be permitted broad access to United States courts in antitrust actions. 2 31 Such access is particularly likely to be exploited in those cases in which the cost of the corporate payment was included in the contract price to the foreign government and private purchasers.
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IV. Ensuring Corporate Accountability:
Private Remedies Revisited
Although the antitrust laws do not by words or implication grant a shareholder right of action against the lawbreaking management of the shareholder's own corporation, 2 33 the prospect of incurring liability may enhance the success of common law derivative suits against responsible officers and directors. The clearer the illegality of overseas payments, the more likely it is that the offending corporation 229. The reasoning of the Supreme Court case relied on in Pfizer, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), as well as the reasoning of the district court's opinion in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions implies that the Pfizer holding was intended to apply only to actions brought by foreign governments in their proprietary capacity. Since most overse.is payments involve governments precisely in that capacity, this implicit limitation of Pfizer should not pose an obstacle to foreign government plaintiffs in payments suits. Less clear is whether courts would be reluctant to award damages to a government for proprietary losses stemming from the misdeeds of that government's officials.
The Pfizer court did not reach the question of a foreign government's standing tinder § 16, but analogous case law concerning American states indicates that such standing should be at least as extensive as that granted under The Yale Law Journal cally close association of a corporation's directors with its executives might color the directors' views of the desirability of suing executives who allegedly violated the law to the corporation's detriment. 246 Finally, the clearer the illegality and the larger the potential recovery, the more the directors' decision not to sue would be tantamount to a breach of trustY' 7 Any one of these considerations might cause a court to override the decision of the directors and sustain a shareholder derivative suit for damages, injunction, or restitution.
Conclusion
In the wake of the controversial disclosures of questionable payments abroad, the response of both the private and the public sectors has been slow and insufficient. With a few notable exceptions, 2 4 1 members of the business community do not seem animated by a conviction that overseas payments must be halted.
2 49 The cautious approach of the President's Task Force, the limited enforcement efforts of the SEC, and the inconclusive action in Congress testify to the inadequacy of present governmental approaches to the problem.
The antitrust approach endorsed in this article is an attractive alternative for two reasons. First, it focuses on those payments that have the most serious economic consequences for American firms and, thereby, for American investors, consumers, and free enterprise gen-
